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Comments
Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases:
Contingent Fee Awards Under
Section 1988
Litigants in state and federal courts generally are not awarded
attorneys' fees as part of their relief.' A lawyer representing a prevailing
party in certain federal civil rights suits, however, is entitled to an
award of reasonable attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. section 1988.2
One purpose of section 1988 is to open the door to individuals with
meritorious civil rights claims who could not otherwise afford to en-
force their rights. A secondary purpose of section 1988 is to enable
private practitioners to commit themselves to civil rights litigation.3
Section 1988, however, does not directly address whether contingent
1. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
2. The Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976). Section 1988 states:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES,"
for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for
their vindication, shall be excercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law,
the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal case is held,
so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition
of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on
the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
Id.
3. See S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 5910. Congress recognized that in many cases arising under our civil rights laws,
the plaintiff has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be
able tb assert their civil rights, citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs
them to vindicate these rights in court. Id. See also Comment, The Civil Rights Attorney's
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fee agreements between attorney and client are to be upheld when
a reasonable fee pursuant to section 1988 is available; nor does sec-
tion 1988 address how the contingent fee is to affect the determina-
tion of a section 1988 fee award.4
The United States Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhar5 attempted
to interpret the legislative history of section 1988 by designating a
formula for the determination of a reasonable fee.6 The Court in
Hensley held that the fee award should reflect reasonable hours charged
at a reasonable rate.7 The Court acknowledged that other factors must
be considered, including whether a contingent fee agreement exists
between client and counsel that may require a district court to adjust
a fee upward or downward.' Cases decided by the federal circuit and
district courts since Hensley, however, indicate the Supreme Court
was not successful in setting firm criteria for the determination of
a reasonable fee when a contingent fee agreement exists.9
Since Hensley, various federal appellate courts have addressed the
issue of how to determine a reasonable fee under section 1988 when
a contingent fee agreement exists."0 These courts agree that no losing
party should have to pay a fee to the prevailing party in excess of
a reasonable amount. Confusion exists, however, as to the calcula-
tion of a reasonable fee and as to the weight that should be given
a contingent fee agreement in the determination of a reasonable fee.
One approach proposes that the existence of a contingent fee agree-
ment does not preclude the award of a reasonable fee pursuant to
section 1988." Under this approach, the court first determines a
reasonable fee. The court awarded attorneys' fee is limited, however,
Fees Awards Act of 1976: A View From the Second Circuit, 29 BUFFALO L. Rav. 559, 559
(1980) (the Awards Act was envisioned as a boon to litigants and attorneys. The act was to
benefit all citizens through active litigation of civil rights).
4. See generally S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CoN . & AD. NEWs 5908-09.
5. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
6. Id. at 433-34.
7. Id. at 433.
3. Id. at 434 n.9 (the Court was specifically referring to the factors set out by the Fifth
Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974)).
9. Compare Cooper, 719 F.2d 1496, 1500-1501 with Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d 1404,
1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Tenth Circuit used the Hensley test to determine the statutory award;
the Ninth Circuit used the equivalent of the factors set out by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson
to determine the statutory award).
10. See e.g. Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409 (the Ninth Circuit held that the contingent fee
agreement should be upheld if reasonable); Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1496 (the Tenth Circuit effec-
tively eliminated contingent fee agreements in civil rights cases); Pharr v. Housing Authority
of the City of Prichard, 704 F.2d 1216, 1217 (lth Cir. 1983) (the Eleventh Circuit used the
contingent fee as a ceiling for the statutory award).
11. See Pharr, 704 F.2d 1216.
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by the amount agreed upon in the contingent fee contract. 2 Therefore,
the agreed upon contingent fee limits the reasonable fee awarded by
the court under section 1988.13 For example, if the contingent fee
contract was for thirty three percent of the total recovery, the statutory
award under section 1988 could not exceetl thirty three percent of
that amount. If the recovery was only $10,000, the attorney would
be limited to $3,333 in fees, which may not cover the attorney's actual
time and expenses. This approach mandates that the difference be-
tween the reasonable fee determined by the court under section 1988,
and the contingent fee agreement between the attorney and prevail-
ing party will be paid by the losing party.' 4
In contrast, another approach effectively eliminates contingent fee
agreements between client and counsel in civil rights cases by holding
that the contingent fee agreement can be no higher than the reasonable
fee determined by the court pursuant to section 1988."5 Under this
approach, the district court first determines the reasonable fee pur-
suant to fee section 1988.6 The contingent fee agreement is then limited
to the amount of the reasonable fee on the theory that the fee deter-
mined pursuant to section 1988 is adequate compensation for the at-
torney's services."
Finally, a middle approach will uphold a contingent fee agreement
if that agreement is reasonable. ' 8 The court will consider the existence
of the contingent fee agreement in calculating the reasonable fee under
section 1988.' 9 This compromise approach gives the court discretion
to compel a prevailing party, rather than a losing party, to pay the
difference between the fee awarded pursuant to section 1988 and the
contingent fee agreement.2"
Initially, this comment will analyze section 1988 and contingent fee
agreements in civil rights litigation.2 This comment will then examine
the approaches of various federal courts of appeals to the award of
reasonable attorneys' fees under section 1988 when a contingent fee
agreement exists between the attorney and the party in a civil rights
action.22 This comment will conclude that an award of reasonable
12. Id. at 1217.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1218.
15. See Cooper, 719 F.2d 1507.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 28-176 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 177-236 and accompanying text.
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attorneys' fees under section 1988 and contingent fee agreements are
not mutually exclusive.2 3 The existence of a contingent fee agreement
should not preclude the award of a reasonable fee to the prevailing
party pursuant to section 1988.24 The contingent fee should limit the
determination of a reasonable fee25 and should be a factor in the
determination of the fee award under section 1988.26 Finally, an
approach to the problem of the weight to be given to a contingent
fee agreement in the determination of a reasonable fee will be recom-
mended that comports with both the legislative history of 1988 and
the purpose of contingent fee agreements."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CURRENT ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1988
A. The American Rule
Prior to 1976, attorneys' fees in federal civil rights litigation were
governed by the "American Rule." 2 Under the American Rule, each
party in a lawsuit pays its own counsel. 2 The rationale behind the
rule is that parties should not be penalized merely for defending or
bringing a lawsuit.30 Routinely awarding attorneys' fees would un-
justly discourage the poor from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponent's
counsel.3
Federal courts traditionally have refrained from awarding attorneys'
fees to prevailing parties in civil rights cases absent either specific
23. See infra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 27-172 and accompanying text.
25. See Pharr, 704 F.2d at 1217.
26. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1407.
27. See infra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.
28. The American Rule differs from the English Rule, under which fees are routinely awarded
to the prevailing party. See Comment, supra note 3, at 561 n.8; see also, Howard, Attorney's
Fees Under Civil Rights Litigation - An Evasive Standard, 20 IDAHO L. REv. 635, 637 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Howard, Attorney's Fees].
29. See Howard, supra note 28, at 637.
30. Id.
31. See generally Howard, Attorney's Fees, supra note 28, at 637. See also Note, Survey-
ing the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 59 NOTRE DAME
L. REV, 1293 n.2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Surveying the Law] citing Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). But see Note, Promoting
the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 30 COLUMBIA L.
REv. 346, 348 (1980). Criticism of the American Rule has been abundant. Commentators argue
that far from being democratic, the American Rule effectively denies the poor access to the
courts by withholding an important means for paying counsel. Id. See generally Ehrenzweig,
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society 54 CALF. L. REv. 792 (1966); Tunney,
Financing the Costs of Legal Rights, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 632 (1974) (articles criticizing the
American Rule for the aforementioned reasons).
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statutory authorization 32 or a finding that the case falls under one
of several well recognized judicial exceptions which allow fee awards."
The most significant exception to the American Rule is the private
attorney general exception.34 If litigants benefit a particular class and
the action effectuates a strong congressional policy by bringing suit,
the litigants will be deemed private attorneys general and will be en-
titled to a fee award. 3" The second exception to the American Rule
is the bad faith exception. The court will award attorneys' fees to
a party whose opponent has proceeded in bad faith, vexatiously, or
oppressively.3 6 The third exception to the American Rule is the com-
mon fund doctrine. 37 A common fund is created and the fund is used
to pay attorneys' fees in cases when the litigation is for the benefit
of others. 31 Finally, an attorney may recover fees from a recalcitrant
defendant who disobeys a court order in a civil contempt proceeding.39
In 1975, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the American Rule in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society." In Alyeska, the
Court was faced with determining the propriety of an award for at-
torney's fees to environmental interests that had sought to prevent
issuance of permits by the Secretary of Interior authorizing the con-
struction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline." After receiving a favorable
ruling granting injunctive relief, plaintiffs claimed a substantial amount
for attorneys' fees incurred in bringing the action. 2 The Court held
that, in general, federal courts do not have the power to award
attorneys' fees to civil litigants in the absence of congressional
authorization. 3 The result of Alyeska was to render fee awards
unavailable in most civil rights actions, particularly those actions
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11
32. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1876) (the Supreme Court held that
federal courts are not empowered to award fees without congressional authorization).
33. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1293 n.l. See also Howard, Attorney's
Fees, supra note 28, at 637.
34. See Comment, supra note 3, at 559.
35. Id.
36. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1293 n.l.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 421 U.S, 240 (1975).
41. Id. at 241.
42. Id. at 241. See also Howard, supra note 28, at 638 (under the theory that they were
performing the services of "private attorneys general").
43. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 240 (the court acknowledged the exception to the general
rule for bad faith on the part of a party). Id. at 245.
44. See Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act: Expansion and Contraction,
46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 865, 874 (1980).
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Less than one year after Alyeska, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 (1976 Act)."5 The 1976 Act
amended section 1988 to allow district courts to award reasonable
attorneys' fees to parties who prevail in actions brought under cer-
tain civil rights statutes." The stated purpose of the 1976 Act was
to allow courts to provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel
fees to prevailing parties in suits to enforce various civil rights acts
passed by Congress since 1866.41 The 1976 Act was also intended to
fill gaps in civil rights laws created by Alyeska and to achieve con-
sistency in civil rights laws." Congress placed a high value on civil
rights suits brought by individuals and sought to stimulate private
enforcement of civil rights.49 The legislative history of the 1976 Act
states that the remedy of attorneys' fees has always been recognized
as particularly appropriate in the civil rights area."0 Specifically, Con-
gress has instructed the courts to use the broadest and most effective
remedies to achieve the goals of civil rights laws. 5'
45. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1294 (the Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act of 1976 was enacted in part as a response to the decision in Alyeska).
46. 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976). The pertinent language of section 1988 states:
fiun any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. The sections to which section 1988 applies are commonly referred to as the Reconstruction
Era Civil Rights Acts. Section 1981 requires equality in civil rights. 42 U.S.C. §1981. Section
1982 guarantees all persons within the United States jurisdiction equality in civil rights. 42
U.S.C. §1982. Section 1983 prohibits anyone from depriving any United States citizen or any
person within jurisdiction of the United States of any right, privilege or immunity granted
by the Constitution under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1985 prohibits con-
spiracies to interfere with the civil rights of another. 42 U.S.C. §1985. Section 1986 provides
a penalty for those who are aware of conspiracies that violate section 1985 but fail to act
to prevent the interference although they have the power to do so. 42 U.S.C. §1986.
47. See S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5908-09.
48. Id.; see also Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1294. Prior to the 1976 Act,
attorneys' fees were not awarded unless the court could find that the prevailing party fit under
one of the recognized exceptions to the American Rule. The result was that some prevailing
parties were able to recover attorneys' fees, while others were not. The 1976 Act attempts
to rectify this discrepancy, allowing the award of attorneys' fees to all prevailing parties in
specified civil rights litigation. Id.
49. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 5910.
50. Id.
51. Id. The Senate Committee quoted Judge Clark in Hall v. Cole: "Not to award counsel
fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the act itself by frustrating its
basic purpose." Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1295.
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B. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under the 1976 Act
Section 1988 allows the prevailing party5 2 to recover attorneys' fees
in certain civil rights cases.5 3 In an overwhelming majority of cases,
the party seeking to vindicate rights protected by the civil rights statutes
will be the plaintiff.5 4  Congress intended that the standards for
awarding fees be generally the same as the fee provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act," which adopted the criteria developed by the Supreme
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc." In Newman, the
plaintiffs prevailed by obtaining an injunction under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting racial discrimination at a drive-
in establishment. 7 Legislation similar to section 1988 authorized the
court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party.5" The Supreme
Court held that a prevailing59 plaintiff should ordinarily recover at-
torneys' fees unless special circumstances would render recovery un-
just.6" The rationale behind the holding in Newman is that "private
attorneys general" should not be deterred from bringing good faith
actions to vindicate fundamental rights by the prospect of having to
pay their opponents' counsel fees should they lose.6
52. To be a prevailing party, a plaintiff need only achieve some degree of success, winning
at least, "an important matter in the course of the litigation since to delay a fee award until
the entire litigation is concluded would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel."
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974); see also, Garrison,
Attorney's Fees Under Fee-Shifting Statutes, 56 CONN. B. JOURNAL 66, 67 (1982).
53. The Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1976).
54. See Comment, supra note 3, at 565.
55. 42 U.S.C. §2000a (1976). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in places of public accomodation. Section 2000a-3(b) covers attorneys' fees and provides:
"In any action pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevail-
ing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and
the United States shall be liable for cost the same as a private person." Id. §2000a-3(b)(1976).Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits discriminatory practices. Section 2000e-5(k) covers
attorneys' fees and provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Com-
mission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and
the commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private
person.
42 U.S.C. §2000e (1976). The most notable distinction regarding attorneys' fees between Titles
II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section 1988 is that in Titles II and VII Con-
gress included express language imposing liability on the United States equal to that of a private
person. Courts later found the omission of such language in section 1988 critical and exempted
the United States from liability under the act. See Note, supra note 31, at 1295.
56. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
57. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 400-401.
58. Id. at 401 n.l. See supra note 55 (text of 42 U.S.C. §2000a-3(b)).
59. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978).
60. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text for a defini-
tion of special circumstances.
61. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws AT 5912.
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Similarly, in Northcross v. Board of Education,62 successful plain-
tiffs in an action resulting in desegregation of public schools in Mem-
phis, Tennessee, sought attorneys' fees.63 The Supreme Court indicated
that a plaintiff obtaining an injunction is a prevailing party.64 The
Court held that as the prevailing party, plaintiff was entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to statutory authorization, unless
special circumstances existed. 65 This principle became known as the
Newman-Northcross rule, and has provided the basis for awards of
attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs seeking and obtaining equitable
injunctions in civil rights litigation.66
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
precise issue of what constitutes "special circumstances" as mentioned
in Northcross, the decisions of a number of courts of appeal provide
guidance in this area.67 Special circumstances that would render an
award unjust have been defined by courts as, for example, a tort
action cloaked in a due process constitutional claim,68 or litigation
that did not benefit the public. 69 Special circumstances do not include
the defendant's good faith,10 the plaintiff's ability to pay attorneys'
fees, 7' or the plaintiff's recovery of minor or nominal damages.72
The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that prevailing defen-
dants may also recover fees." The United States Supreme Court in
62. 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 428.
65. Id.
66. See Howard, supra note 28, at 641-42.
67. The strongest justification for the refusal to award attorneys' fees because of special
circumstances was outlined by the Second Circuit. See Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044
(2nd. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1977). The court stressed that the availability
of competent counsel precluded the necessity of an award of attorneys' fees. This conclusion
was based on the rationale that the award of attorneys' fees would attract competent counsel.
Id. But compare Milwe v. Cavuota, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2nd Cir. 1981) (the court held that denial
of attorneys' fees amounted to an abuse of judicial discretion since attorneys' fees should not
be denied just because the plaintiff had the financial resources to obtain competent counsel),
with Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) (the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
denied attorneys' fees under section 1988 to successful plaintiffs who prevailed in establishing
a violation of their civil rights, explaining that the defendants' conduct did not involve a viola-
tion of a broad public interest and the nature of the litigation was such that it would attract
competent counsel).
68. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1298 n.30, citing Martin v. Hancock,
466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.C. Minn. 1983) (common law negligence dog bite case); Zarcone
v. Perry, 438 F. Supp. 788, 790 (E.D. N.Y. 1977) (false imprisonment and false arrest case).
69. Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1298 n.3, citing Martin, 466 F. Supp.
at 456; Zarcone, 438 F. Supp. at 790; Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (Ist Cir.
1979); Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979).
70. See Garrison, supra note 52, at 68.
71. Id. at 69.
72. Id. at 68-69.
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); Note, Surveying the Law,
supra note 31, at 1299.
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Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,74 however, refused to extend
the statutory award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant."' In
Christianburg, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) sued Christianburg Garment Company on charges of unlawful
employment practices.7 6 The district court granted Christianburg's
motion for summary judgment." The company then petitioned for
a grant of attorneys' fees against the EEOC pursuant to section 706(k)
of Title VII." Section 706 authorizes district courts to grant the prevail-
ing party a reasonable attorney's fee. 79 Finding that the action brought
by EEOC was not without merit, the district court ruled that an award
of attorneys' fees to Christianburg was not justified.80 The Circuit
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.8'
Therefore, after Christianburg, defendants may receive a statutory
award pursuant to section 1988 only if the plaintiff's suit was frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless, or if the plaintiff continued to litigate
after the action clearly had become frivolous.
82
Most courts are reluctant to rule that a plaintiff has litigated in bad
faith to avoid chilling the plaintiff's excercise of civil rights.83 The
Christianburg court noted that this high standard favors prevailing
plaintiffs over prevailing defendants for two reasons. 4 First, the plain-
tiff is the instrument chosen to advance congressional policy." Second,
if a plaintiff prevails, the fee award is against the defendant who
has violated federal laws. 6 As a result, defendants rarely will be
awarded attorneys' fees in civil rights suits. Prevailing plaintiffs,
however, will be awarded attorneys' fees, unless special circumstances
render the award unjust.
C. Establishing a Reasonable Fee
Once a party has established entitlement to a fee award, the court
must calculate the proper amount of the award. 7 The determination
74. 434 U.S. 412 (1978); see also, Howard, supra note 31, 643-44.
75. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
76. Id. at 414.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 415.
79. See Id. at 412.
80. Id.
81. See Christianburg, 550 F.2d 949.
82. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
83. See Comment, supra note 3, at 565.
84. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 418-419.
85. Id. at 418.
86. Id. at 419.
87. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1309.
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of a reasonable fee is crucial to promoting the purpose of section
1988, since the size of fee awards will directly affect the willingness
of attorneys to litigate civil rights suits. 8 An award must not be a
windfall to the attorney, yet must approach the amount an attorney
would have earned in similar work. 9
Courts currently do not use a consistent approach for determining
a reasonable fee.90 The legislative history of section 1988 contained
minimal guidance on fee calculation.' The Senate Report on section
1988, however, cites the twelve factors announced in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express.92 In Johnson, the plaintiff brought an action
for damages and a class action for injunctive relief by reason of his
discharge from employment allegedly because of race or color." The
district court entered a final order in plaintiff's favor and made an
award of attorneys' fees.9 ' The appellate court held that since the
award did not elucidate factors upon which the determination was
based, the case would be remanded for reconsideration in light of
guidelines promulgated by the court. 95 The Johnson factors include
the time and labor expended by counsel; 96 the novelty and difficulty
of the case;97 the particular skill of the attorney;98 any preclusive effect
88. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO.
& AD. NEWS 5908.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce
the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are
to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental
laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to
recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
Id. See also Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1309.
89. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1309.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1310. See generally S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws.
92. 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974). The twelve criteria are analogous to those
enumerated in the MODEL CODE OF PROFEssiONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1979), for
calculating attorneys' fees, with the exception of: criterion number 10 - the undesirability
of being associated with the case. Id. at 719.
93. Id. at 714.
94. Id. at 716.
95. Id.
96. See King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1028 (1st Cir. 1977) (the court considered in
the calculation of the fee award that the attorney had spent more than 80 hours on the case);
Suzuki v. Yuen, 507 F. Supp. 819, 824 (D. Hawaii 1981) (the court considered time and labor
required for preparation of briefs and oral argument).
97. See King, 560 F.2d at 1028 (the case was novel in that the civil rights suit was to
improve conditions of confinement at a treatment center for the sexually dangerous); Blum
v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 (the court rejected the argument that since the issues were
novel and litigation complex the fee award should be increased by fifty percent).
98. See King, 560 F.2d at 1024 (the award of $4,000 in attorneys' fees was reasonable,
particularly since the results depended upon the work of counsel and counsel performed with
diligence and skill); United States v. 243.538 Acres of Land, 509 F. Supp. 981, 989 (D. Hawaii
1981) (the court considered the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly).
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the case might have had on counsel's ability to take other cases;99
the attorney's customary fee; 00 the contingent nature of the litiga-
tion;'"' any unusual time limitations imposed by the litigant;', 2 the
amount of money invoved in the case, or relief sought;0 3 the ex-
perience, ability and reputation of counsel; °'0 any undesirability in
being associated with the case; 0 5 the length of the relationship be-
tween the attorney and client;' 6 and finally, awards in similar cases.'0 7
The Johnson factors, however useful, have not reduced the confu-
sion regarding the calculation of fee awards to any substantial degree.' 9
Commentators have criticized the factors because the Johnson court
failed to state which factors, if any, should be weighed more heavily
than others.'0 9 In addition, some of the factors appear redundant," 0
and others contradict the legislative history of section 1988.1' Despite
this criticism, most courts have adopted the Johnson factors." 2 The
99. See Suzuki, 507 F. Supp. at 824 (the court found no preclusive effect on counsels'
ability to take other cases).
100. 104 S. Ct. at 1547 (fee award calculated by the prevailing market rate); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mechlenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D., at 486 (fee award calculated with reference
to hourly rates generally charged in federal litigation); 243.538 Acres of Land, 509 F. Supp.
at 989 (the court considered the customary fee in determining the fee award).
101. See Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals used the existence of a contingent fee agreement as a factor in the determination
of the fee award). But see Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1498 (10th Cir. 1983) (the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals used the fee award to limit the contingent fee agreement, effectively
eliminating contingent fee agreements in civil rights cases).
102. See Suzuki, 507 F. Supp. at 824 (the court considered the fact that no unusual time
limits were imposed by the litigant).
103. Id. (the court considered the amount involved and results obtained).
104. Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1308. (9th Cir. 1980) (counsel had demonstrated
skill and experience in civil rights litigation); King, 560 F.2d at 1024 (the court noted that
the results of the case depended on counsels' performing with diligence and ability).
105. See Yuclan Intern, Inc. v. Arre, 504 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (1980) (plaintiff's counsel
failed to cite characteristics which rendered the case undesirable).
106. See Suzuki, 507 F. Supp. at 824 (the court found no evidence as to the length of
the attorney-client relationship).
107. See Dennis, 611 F.2d at 1308 (award of attorney's fee was in part based specifically
upon the fact that rates of compensation were typical of those earned by experienced Honolulu
attorneys).
108. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1311.
109. Id.; See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable?", 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 281, 286-87 (1977) Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1311.
110. Id. at 1311 n.l 15 "Time and labor required" and "novelty and difficulty" are redun-
dant, as are "attorney's skill" and "experience, ability and reputation of counsel." Id. at 1311
n.115.
111. Id. at 1311. The length of the relationship between attorney and client and amount
of money involved in the case conflict with the legislative history of §1988. Id. at 1311 n. 116.
See S. REP. No. 94-1011, supra note 47, at 6.
112. But see Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) (the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals rejected the criteria due to inherent complexity and subjectivity). See
also Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 515 F.2d 165, 167-169 (3rd Cir. 1975) (the Third Circuit
utilizes the criteria set forth in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
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courts, however, have applied the factors differently. 1 3 The result
is that attorneys are not able to confidently evaluate their chances
of receiving a reasonable fee, and are ultimately discouraged from
representing clients in civil rights cases." 4 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart,"51 decided the proper method
for calculating fee awards." 6 By the time Hensley was decided many
lower courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, had
de-emphasized the Johnson factors because of the difficulty of ap-
plying them.' 17
In Hensley, plaintiff's brought an action on behalf of all persons
involuntarily confined at the forensic unit of a state hospital." I Plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality of the medical treatment received
and general conditions at the hospital." 9 The district court found con-
stitutional violations and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. 2 '
The court of appeals affirmed the district court ruling.' The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the case, holding that the district court
did not properly consider the relationship between the extent of plain-
tiff's success and the amount of the attorney's fee award.' 22
Specifically, the district court refused to eliminate from the attorney's
fee award the hours spent by respondent's attorneys on unsuccessful
claims.' 23 The Supreme Court held that the extent of a plaintiff's suc-
cess is a crucial factor in the fee award determination under section
1988. '24 In a situation in which the plaintiff failed to prevail on a
claim unrelated to the successful claim, the hours spent on unsuc-
Sanitary Corp.); Lindy Brothers, 487 F.2d 161, 166-169 (3rd Cir. 1961) (the Lindy formula
multiplied the hours spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for each
attorney involved, and considered (I) the contingent nature of the case, and (2) the quality
of work performed, complexity of issues, and recovery obtained, to determine a reasonable fee).
113. Compare Kiser v. Huge, 517 F.2d 1237, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the court discounted
the fee award because of the small amount of public benefit of the litigation) with Doherty
v. Wilson, 356 F. Supp. 35, 41 (M.D. Ga. 1973) (the court found the fact that the case had
little public benefit was irrelevant to the award of fees); see Note, Surveying the Law, supra
note 31, at 1311 n.117 (discussing these cases).
114. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1311-12.
115. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
116. Id. at 1312.
117. Id.
118. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426.
119. Id.
120. See Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (1979).
121. 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981).
122. 461 U.S. at 424.
123. ld-
124. Id.
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cessful claims should be excluded in considering the amount of a
reasonable fee.' 25
The Hensley court employed a two-step process to calculate a fee
award.' 26 First, the court determined that the plaintiff was a prevail-
ing party.' 27 Second, the court decided upon a reasonable fee.' 2 To
arrive at the reasonable fee, the court multiplied reasonable hours
by a reasonable rate.'2 9 Discretionary adjustments of this initial fee
were made by factoring in the results obtained, and if necessary, the
Johnson factors.'3 °
The Hensley decision has been criticized, however, for overemphasiz-
ing the "results obtained" factor in discretionary adjustments to the
base fee."' The Hensley opinion has been criticized also for failing
to articulate clear standards to be used in the application of the test."1
2
Terms such as "prevailing party," "results obtained," "reasonable
hours," and "reasonable rates" were not clearly defined by the
Supreme Court in Hensley."' Neither Johnson nor Hensley provides
the lower courts with objective criteria to calculate a reasonable fee
under section 1988.11" Further, the lower courts are still unclear as
to which standard to use." 5 While most courts have adopted the test
enunciated in Hensley, some courts still use the Johnson factors, or
their equivalent, to determine a fee award under section 1988.36 As
a result, attorneys still must speculate as to their possible fee award
under section 1988 in civil rights cases." 7 This uncertainty undermines
the effectiveness of section 1988, since counsel representing clients
in civil rights cases have no basis upon which to predict their fee
award." The dual legislative purposes of section 1988, namely, to
enable individuals to enforce their rights and to enable private practi-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 433-34. See Note, The Supreme Court's "Reasonable Fee" Test Under Section
1988 - Hensley v. Eckerhart, 20 VAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 495 (1984).
127. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 433 n.9.
131. See Note, Surveying the Law, supra note 31, at 1314.
132. See Note, supra note 126, at 503.
133. Id. See, e.g., Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 564 F. Supp. 765, 766-68 (E.D.
Mo. 1983); Pinshaw v. Monk, 565 F. Supp. 44, 45-47 (D. Mass. 1983) (illustrations of prob-
lems that have resulted from the lack of precision in Hensley revealing conflicting applications
of the Hensley test).
134. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
135. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
136. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1407.
137. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
1287
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
tioners to commit themselves to civil rights litigation are weakened
by the uncertainty surrounding the computation of a reasonable fee.'"9
CONTINGENT FEES
A contingent fee agreement provides that an attorney will receive
a percentage of the client's recovery at trial or through settlement,
but will receive nothing if the suit is unsuccessful.'' At one time con-
tingent fees were not only void, but constituted a criminal offense.' 4'
Today, contingent fees are generally upheld, but are viewed with
disfavor by many. 4 ' While the contingent fee makes possible the en-
forcement of legitimate claims which otherwise might be abandoned
because of the poverty of the claimants, many ethical questions related
to the propriety of the fees remain in dispute.' 3 Contingent fees are
thought to impair the relationship between attorney and client'" and
to give incentive to lawyers to solicit clients, instigate fraudulent or
vexatious claims and use unethical practices in prosecuting these
claims."' Contingent fees are thought to also tempt the attorney to
settle the claim in a manner advantageous to the attorney and not
the client.' 6 As a result, courts closely scrutinize contingent fee
agreements."'
Three common justifications exist for contingent fee agreements.' 48
First, by making a lawyer's gross earnings depend upon the amount
of the client's recovery, a contingent fee gives a lawyer a direct in-
centive to work in the client's interest.'4 9 Second, a contingent fee
139. Id.
140. See Note, Cooper v. Singer: Contingent Fee Agreements That Exceed Section 1988
Statutory Fee Awards Violate Public Policy, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 635, 637 (1984).
141. See Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 CAtrF. L. REV. 587, 587 (1940). See also
Note, supra note 140, at 637 n.16. A few early decisions in this country relied upon English
common law to find contingent fee agreements illegal. That policy, however, was soon aban-
doned in all states except Massachusetts. Id. The subsequent acceptance of contingent fees in
this country may be explained by the American Rule, which requires litigants to pay their own
attorneys' fees. Id. Contingent fee agreements were not the only way that many potential plaintiffs
could obtain counsel. That purpose is not served in England, where costs are charged to the
losing party. Id.
142. See Radin, supra note 141, at 587.
143. Id. at 589.
144. See Note, Contingent Fee Contracts: Validity, Controls and Enforceability, 47 IOWA
L. REv. 942, 944 (1962).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Note, supra note 140, at 639. See also Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105,
1108-09 (3rd Cir. 1979); See generally Radin, supra note 141.
148. See Schwartz, Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-
Injury Litigation, 22 STN. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1970).
149. Id. Hence, the incentive effect of the contingent fee assures that the lawyer will be
on the client's side. Id.
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allows a client to shift some of the risk inherent in a lawsuit to the
lawyer. 50 Finally, a contingent fee allows a client to borrow a lawyer's
services in advance of settlement.15'
In general, a contingent fee arrangement will be upheld unless harm
to the public or client outweighs the advantages of the fee as a method
of financing lawsuits. 52 Courts may use their supervisory powers to
set aside contingency fees in three situations. 53 First, a court may
set aside a fee if the fee is excessive.' 54 A court determines whether
a fee is excessive by looking at factors such as the degree and amount
of work involved in each case. 155 Second, a court may set aside a
contingent fee agreement if evidence of fraud or unethical conduct
is present.' 5 6 Both the Model Code of Professional Resposibility' 5
and an attorney's status as a fiduciary impose a duty upon the at-
torney to disclose fully relevant factors and to discuss alternative fee
arrangements with the client before entering into a contingent fee ar-
rangement. 5 1 Courts refuse to enforce contingent fee agreements if
an attorney has failed to inform the client of a state statute authoriz-
ing the court to award fees or that the case involves little or no risk. 59
Third, a court may set aside a contingent fee agreement by holding
the contract void as contrary to public policy. 6 An example of a
void contract is a situation in which the attorney's financial interest
in the outcome of the litigation is considered detrimental to an im-
portant state interest.' 6'
The legislative history of section 1988 does not directly address the
impact of contingent fee agreements on the determination of a
150. Id. If the client does not recover, the lawyer receives no fee. The lawyer bears some
of the risk under the contingent fee, since settlement may be less than expected, and the at-
torney's share of the settlement may not fully compensate for the time invested. Id.
151. Id. The client's access to an attorney will be limited, particularly if the client is in
a lower income group. The contingent fee allows a client with limited financial resources to,
in essence, borrow the funds to prosecute the case. Id. at 1125-26.
152. See Note, supra note 140, at 640.
153. Id.
154. See Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., 602 F.2d 1105, 1109 (3rd Cir. 1979); see also Farm-
ington Dowell Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 87-88 (1st Cir. 1970). See general-
ly Note, supra note 140, at 640 (the author discusses the power of courts over contingent fee
agreements).
155. See Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal. 2d 244, 253, 368 P.2d 360, 365, 18 Cal. Rptr. 736,
741 (1962); see also Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P.2d 260, 261 (1975).
156. See Note, supra note 140, at 640 n.30.
157. See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 2-19, 2-20, 5-7 (1981).
158. See Note, supra note 140, at 640.
159. Id. at 640 n.32, 33.
160. Id. at 641.
161. Id. For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits contingent
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reasonable fee.' 62 The Senate Report on section 1988 states only that
in computing the fee, counsel for the prevailing party should be paid,
as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client,
"for all time reasonably expended on a matter."' 63 The Johnson court
treated a contingent fee agreement as one factor in the determination
of a reasonable fee and used the agreed upon fee as an upper limit
for the fee awarded pursuant to section 1988.164 Specifically, the court
in Johnson noted that a fee quoted to the client or the percentage
of recovery agreed upon is helpful in demonstrating the attorney's
fee expectations.'"" Whether or not the attorney agreed to accept a
fee, and in what amount, is not conclusive as to the determination
of a reasonable fee.'
66
Other courts have followed the "bright prospects" rule. 67 The bright
prospects rule requires that fees are not awarded to prevailing parties
who are able to attract counsel through contingency agreements.' 68
The rule is grounded in the rationale that section 1988 is intended
to secure effective representation for civil rights litigants, and that
if a client can secure counsel through a traditional contingent fee agree-
ment, no need exists to apply the benefits of section 1988.69 This
rule, however, finds no support in the legislative history of 1988, and
has not been widely followed.' 70
The Supreme Court in Hensley did not use the existence of a con-
tingent fee agreement as a factor for determining a reasonable fee
under section 1988.' ' The contingent fee agreement was considered
only after the determination of a base fee, and then only at the discre-
tion of the district court.' 72 While Hensley adheres to the notion that
fees in criminal cases. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) (1981). The
Code also strongly discourages the use of contingent fees in domestic relations cases. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmBILrry EC 2-20 (1981).
162. S. REP. N. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws.
163. Id.
164. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See e.g. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2nd Cir. 1978) (the bright prospects
rule was first announced); Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1979) (bright pro-
spects rule followed); see also Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1501.
168. See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1501.
169. Id.
170. Id. See also Sanchez v. Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1982). This one-dimensional
perspective of section 1988 ignores the other purposes of section 1988, which include penalizing
obstructive litigation by civil rights defendants and generally deterring civil rights violations.
See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1501; see also Note, Attorney's Fees in Damages Actions Under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 332, 344-49 (1980).
171. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
172. Id.
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a fee award pursuant to section 1988 and a contingent fee agreement
are not mutually exclusive, the Court did not find the existence of
a contingent fee agreement significant to the determination of a
reasonable fee.' 73
The purpose of a contingent fee agreement, like the award of at-
torneys' fees under section 1988, is to allow litigants who otherwise
may not be able to enforce their claims to have their day in court.'7
While the legislative history of section 1988 does not directly address
the treatment of a contingent fee agreement in the calculation of a
reasonable fee, the stated purpose and legislative intent behind sec-
tion 1988 indicate that a contingent fee agreement should be upheld
for the same reasons that the prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable
fee.' The rationale behind section 1988 and contingent fee agreements
must be considered in determining the best possible solution to the
problem of how to handle contingent fee agreements in conjunction
with a fee award under section 1988.176
APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES
The purpose for the award of a reasonable fee under section 1988
is to encourage meritorious civil rights litigation.'7 7 The purpose of
contingent fee agreements is to permit the enforcement of legitimate
claims which otherwise may be abandoned because of the poverty
of the claimants.'7 8 Generally, courts are in agreement that a section
1988 reasonable fee will be awarded to a prevailing party unless special
circumstances exist.'M The courts also agree that a contingent fee agree-
ment must be upheld unless the fee is found to be unreasonable.' 80
Confusion exists in the courts,'"' however, regarding the weight to
be given to the contingent fee in the determination of the reasonable
173. Id.
174. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 52-86 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 28-176 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See e.g. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402; Northcross, 412 U.S. at 428.
180. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
181. Courts have adopted different approaches to treating a contingent fee when a prevail-
ing party is entitled to a fee award under section 1988. Compare Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d
1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985) (the contingent fee does not preclude a fee award, and the court
has discretion to compel the prevailing party to pay the difference between the two awards)
with Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., 719 F.2d 667, 670 (3rd Cir. 1983) (counsel should
receive the contingent fee or the statutory amount, whichever is greater). See also Lenard v.
Argefito, 699 F.2d 874, 900 (7th Cir. 1983) (the fee contract does not provide an automatic
ceiling on the amount of a fee award in a civil rights action); Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d
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fee pursuant to section 1988.182 The courts also disagree as to whether
the plaintiff'83 or the defendant'"" should be responsible for paying
the difference, if one should exist, between the reasonable fee deter-
mined pursuant to section 1988 and the contingent fee award. This
section will delineate the various approaches and analyze the merits
of each in terms of the purpose of section 1988 and the contingent
fee agreement.
A. Pharr v. Housing Authority of the City of Prichard
In Pharr v. Housing Authority of the City of Prichard,'5 the court
upheld a contingent fee agreement that was in excess of the fee award
determined by the court pursuant to section 1988. The court used
the fee agreed upon in the contingent fee contract to limit the award
of a reasonable fee under section 1988. The losing party was held
responsible for the difference between the reasonable fee determined
by the court and the contingent fee agreement.8 7 In Pharr, after settle-
ment of a suit brought under section 1983 and the fourteenth amend-
ment, the plaintiff moved for an award of attorneys' fees under the
Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act.88 The district court awarded
$6,570 in attorney's fees.'89 That award was less than the award would
have been under the contingent fee contract, which provided that the
expected fee would be one-third of any back pay or damages, or
1496, 1504 (10th Cir. 1983) (the reasonable fee acts as a limitation on the contingent fee agree-
ment, and the contingent fee is considered a factor in the determination of the reasonable
fee); Pharr v. Housing Authority of Prichard, 704 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1983) (the
court limited the award by the terms of the fee contract in a 1983 action and the losing party
paid the difference between the fee award and the contingent fee); Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d
1037, 1047 (2d Cir. 1982) (contingent fee agreement deemed satisfied in full by payment of
the fee award in a section 1983 case); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 594 F.2d 638, 643
(8th Cir. 1979) (the fee award in an age discrimination case was not limited to the amount
provided by the contingent fee agreement because any fees awarded would certainly not exceed
the agreed upon fee); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1978) (fee agreement
is irrelevant to the issue of entitlement and should not enter into the determination of the
amount of a reasonable fee award in a civil rights action); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974) (the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a litigant may
not be awarded a fee greater than the amount in the contingent fee contract agreement).
182. See Cooper, 719 F.2d 1496 (holding that the reasonable fee should limit the contingent
fee agreement).
183. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409 (the court has discretion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the difference between the reasonable fee and contingent fee).
184. See Pharr, 704 F.2d 1216 (the court held that the defendant should be responsible for
paying the difference between the reasonable fee pursuant to section 1988 and the contingent fee).
185. Pharr, 704 F.2d at 1216.
186. Id. at 1218.
187. Id. at 1217.
188. Id. at 1216-17.
189. Id. at 1217.
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$9,667.' 91 The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that
the fee recovery under section 1988 was determined by terms of the
fee contract between plaintiff and attorney, and the award for $9,667
was not unreasonable.' 
91
The rationale in Pharr, namely, upholding the contingent fee if
reasonable and limiting the reasonable fee by the terms of the con-
tingent fee contract, closely comports with the purpose of section 1988
and the purpose behind contingent fee agreements.' 92 Pharr fails,
however, to provide a workable solution to the dilemma of how to
determine a reasonable fee when a contingent fee agreement exists,
because the court held the losing party responsible for the difference
between a reasonable fee award pursuant to section 1988 and the con-
tingent fee.' 93 This solution should be rejected for several reasons.
When a plaintiff voluntarily enters into a contingent fee agreement
knowing that as a prevailing party the attorney will be eligible for
reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to section 1988 as well, the plain-
tiff should be responsible for the amount of attorneys' fees above
and beyond the fee. 9 ' Defendants should not be held responsible for
an amount in excess of the reasonable fee awarded to plaintiffs under
section 1988.' 95 While the solution that the plaintiff be held responsi-
ble for the amount of attorneys' fees above the reasonable fee decreases
a plaintiff's damage recovery, plaintiffs still recover reasonable at-
torneys' fees. Thus, the purpose of section 1988 is effectuated.' 96 In
addition, the plaintiff's right to enter into a private fee agreement
is preserved, which allows plaintiffs with limited finances to obtain
counsel. 97
B. Cooper v. Singer
Another approach to the determination of a reasonable fee under
section 1988 when a contingent fee agreement exists is to eliminate
the contingent fee agreement in civil rights cases. 98 This approach
was adopted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cooper v.
190. Id. at 1218.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1217 (court uses the Johnson rationale; Johnson was cited in the legislative history
to section 1988).
193. Id. at 1218.
194. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409.
195. Id.
196. See Pharr, 704 F.2d at 1216.
197. Id.
198. See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1507.
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Singer.'99 The plaintiffs in Cooper brought a section 1983 suit claim-
ing they were illegally terminated for attempting to organize a union."0
Plaintiffs obtained a judgment in federal district court for $60,000,
each plaintiff receiving a $15,000 share. 20 ' Plaintiffs then petitioned
the district court for attorneys' fees under section 1988.202 Their re-
quest was denied because of the existence of a contingent fee agree-
ment. 203 The court of appeals held that while the existence of a con-
tingent fee agreement did not foreclose the possibility of an attorney's
fee award under section 1988, the contingent fee agreement would
set the upper limit on the amount of the fee award.20 4 On rehearing,
the court held that the existence of a contingent fee agreement did
not limit the client's recovery of attorneys' fees under the civil rights
statute.20 5 The court determined a reasonable fee under section 1988.
The court then compared the reasonable fee to the contingent fee
contract.20 6 If the client's section 1988 attorney fee recovery was less
than the amount owed to the attorney under the contingent fee agree-
ment, the attorney would be expected to reduce the fee to the amount
awarded by the court.2"7 If the fee award was greater than the con-
tingent fee agreement, the attorney would be entitled to the full amount
of the award.200
The Cooper court, at first glance, seemed to adopt the prevailing
view that a contingent fee agreement does not limit or preclude a
prevailing party's fee award. 2 9 The court relied upon the Hensley
formula, reiterating the rationale that the contingent fee is a rele-
vant, but inconclusive, indication of the value of an attorney's ser-
vices. 21 0 The determination by the Cooper court, however, that the
reasonable fee awarded pursuant to section 1988 limits the contingent
fee in effect eliminates the contingent fee in civil rights actions.2 '
The rationale of the court in Cooper was not consistent with the
legislative intent of section 1988, or with the purpose of contingent
199. Id. at 1496.
200. Id. at 1497.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1498.
205. Id. at 1496.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1502.
210. Id. at 1500.
211. See Note, supra note 140, at 640.
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fee arrangements. 2  The elimination of the contingent fee is un-
necessary and conflicts with the general rule upholding contingent fees
barring unusual circumstances. 3 In addition, elimination of contingent
fee arrangements may serve as a disincentive for clients and attorneys
to litigate civil rights violations.2 '4 While the court in Cooper con-
cluded that Congress intended that the section 1988 fee award fulfill
the plaintiffs fee obligations, the result in Cooper does not comport
with the aim of section 1988.215 Section 1988 seeks-to provide an in-
centive for clients and attorneys to bring meritorious civil rights
actions. 1 6 Cooper takes away this incentive by limiting the attorney's
fee to the reasonable fee awarded by the court pursuant to section
1988.
C. Hamner v. Rios
A third approach to the determination of a statutory award under
section 1988 when a contingent fee agreement exists has been taken
recently by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamner v. Rios.2 17
In Hamner, the prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action filed a motion
for an award of attorneys' fees under section 1988.18 The district
court denied the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees based upon the
existence of a contingent fee agreement." 9 The court of appeals held
that failure to award attorneys' fees under the attorney's fee provi-
sions of the civil rights statute was an abuse of discretion ".22  The
proper procedure for the district court would have been to determine
a reasonable award of attorneys' fees. 22 1 If the award under that
analysis was less than the contingent fee, the trial court could in its
discretion determine whether the plaintiff should be compelled to pay
the difference between the reasonable fee awarded by the court pur-
suant to section 1988 and the contingent fee. 2
212. But see Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1504. "Legislative history on this issue is sparse; never-
theless the history seems to imply that the fee award should fully define the attorney's compen-
sation." (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5908-09.
213. See Note, supra note 140, at 640.
214. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409.
215. See generally S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5908-09.
216. See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1507.
217. 769 F.2d 1404.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1405.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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The Hamner opinion reiterated the rule that a contingent fee agree-
ment should be enforced if reasonable. 2 3 Hamner differs from Pharr
in holding that the court has discretion to compel the prevailing party
to pay any difference between a contingent fee and a reasonable fee. 2 4
The court in Hamner utilized an equivalent of the Johnson factors 22
to determine the reasonable fee. 226 Furthermore, the court adopted
the viewpoint that the existence of a contingent fee agreement is only
one factor that the court must consider in the determination of the
fee award.227
The result reached by the court in Hamner comports with the ra-
tionale behind both of the two fee awards, and provides a fair and
equitable solution to the problem.22 Specifically, the Hamner court
noted that a prevailing party in a civil rights suit is entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees.2 29 The court also acknowledged that con-
tingent fee agreements are to be enforced if reasonable, emphasizing,
however, the power of the court to supervise fee awards under con-
tingency agreements to avoid unreasonable results.2 13 Furthermore, the
court supported this rule by stating that since a plaintiff voluntarily
enters into a contingent fee agreement, the difference should come
out of the plaintiff's damages recovery. 3' In addition, the court has
the discretion to deny an award of the difference between the
reasonable fee determined by the court pursuant to section 1988 and
the sum provided in the contingent fee agreement, in situations in
which counsel's performance was poor, or when an award beyond
the reasonable fee would constitute a windfall to the attorney. 23
2
The three different viewpoints dividing the federal courts of appeal
can be summarized as follows: (1) contingent fees should provide a
limit on the award of a reasonable fee awarded pursuant to section
1988, with the defendant responsible for paying any difference be-
223. Id. at 1409.
224. Id.; see also Pharr, 704 F.2d 1217.
225. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).
226. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1407.
227. Id. This is implicit in the use by the court of the Kerr factors. The existence of a
contingent fee agreement is one of twelve factors used by the court in the determination of
the fee award. Id. See also Sullivan v. Crown Paper, 719 F.2d 667, 668-69 (3rd Cir. 1983);
Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899 (7th Cir. 1983).
228. See supra notes 28-176 and accompanying text.
229. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1406 (quoting 42 U.S.C §1988).
230. Id. at 1409 (this rule preserves the rights of parties to enter into their own contracts,
and avoids unnecessary interference with the attorney-client relationship).
231. Id. The court declined to hold civil rights defendants responsible for an amount in
excess of the reasonable fee awarded against them under section 1988.
232. Id. at 1409-10.
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tween the fee award and the contingent fee agreement; 33 (2) con-
tingent fees should be eliminated in civil rights cases;"" (3) the con-
tingent fee agreement should be upheld if reasonable, but the court
has discretion to compel the plaintiff to pay any difference between
the fee award the and the contingent fee."' While the last proposal
seems to follow the legislative intent of 1988 and the purpose behind
contingent fee agreements, a more objective set of criteria must be
developed to determine the reasonable fee before the aim of section
1988 can be met.236
PROPOSAL
The rationale developed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hamner should be adopted by all of the federal courts. Contingent
fee agreements should be one factor in the determination of the
reasonable fee,2 37 and contingent fee agreements should be upheld
unless unreasonable. The court should have discretion to compel a
plaintiff to pay the difference between the fee award under section
1988 and the contingent fee.2 38 Before this solution can carry out the
aims of the legislature in enacting section 1988, however, a uniform,
objective set of criteria must be adopted by Congress for the deter-
mination of a reasonable fee.239 Presently, no clear standard exists.240
Some courts are still using the Johnson factors, while others have
adopted the Hensley test.24' Both of these tests have been criticized
for allowing too much discretion to the lower courts and for requir-
ing excessive subjective analysis.24 Before section 1988 can encourage
meritorious civil rights litigation, attorneys need to be able to predict,
with some certainty, the size of fee awards under the statute.243 Only
when an attorney can calculate the fee award with reasonable accuracy
and certainty will the purpose behind section 1988 be effectuated.244
One commentator has suggested that courts adopt the standard enun-
ciated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,'  which was cited with
233. See Pharr, 704 F.2d at 1217-18.
234. See Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1504.
235. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409.
236. See infra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.
237. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 714.
238. See Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409.
239. See Note, supra note 126, at 503.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
242. See Note, supra note 126, at 502.
243. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
244. Id.
245. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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approval in the legislative history of section 1988.246 Newman
necessitates a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine who
is a prevailing party. 247 Second, the court must determine whether
any special circumstances2 "' exist that would preclude recovery by that
prevailing party.2' 9 The Johnson factors are applied under this test
only when the court concludes that the fee award should be en-
hanced.250
While the Newman test is more objective and less time-consuming
than that in either Johnson or Hensley, the test fails to consider as
part of the base fee determination factors such as a contingent fee
agreement or the preclusive effect that the case may have had on
counsel's ability to take other cases. 25' These factors should be con-
sidered in the determination of a reasonable fee under section 1988.
The ideal standard for the determination of a fee award under sec-
tion 1988 is a combination of the tests proposed by the Hensley,
Johnson and Newman courts. As indicated in the legislative history
of section 1988 and case law interpreting the statute, fees should be
awarded only to a prevailing party.252 A formula like the formula
in Hensley2" must be developed and carefully defined. The test must
take into account, however, those of the Johnson factors that com-
port with the legislative history of section 1988.254 The contingent
nature of the fee, awards in similar cases, the time and skill expended
by the attorney and the preclusive effect of the case must be con-
sidered by the court in determining a reasonable fee.255 To imple-
ment this test effectively, Congress must carefully define each term
so that courts can award fees with consistency. Specifically, terms
including "prevailing party," "special circumstances," and the factors
to be used in the determination of the fee award must be clarified.
Counsel will then be able to determine, with some accuracy, the fee
award under section 1988. Only then will the purpose of section 1988
be effectuated.
246. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws, 5910.
247. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text; see also Newman, 390 U.S. at 400.
248. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
249. See Note, supra note 126, at 502.
250. Id. at 503. The factors should never be used to decrease the attorney's award. An
increased award, however, should be the exception, not the rule. Id.
251. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-718.
252. S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNO.
& AD. NEws, 5910.
253. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
254. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-719.
255. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Senate report on section 1988 recognized that if the cost of
private enforcement becomes too great, no private enforcement of
civil rights claims will occur. The report further suggested that unless
our civil rights laws are to become "mere pronouncements that the
average citizen can not enforce," attorneys' fees must be awarded.
While section 1988 does not guarantee the award of attorneys' fees,
the language of the Act reflects a general goal of Congress to award
fees.
Section 1988 does not directly address the impact of a contingent
fee agreement on the determination of a reasonable fee. The legislative
history of section 1988 and the purpose of the contingent fee agree-
ment indicate, however, that the contingent fees and reasonable fees
determined by the courts pursuant to section 1988 need not be mutually
exclusive. Courts have proposed various solutions to this problem,
ranging from allowing the contingent fee to limit the reasonable fee
to effectively eliminating contingent fee agreements in civil rights cases.
Only the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals com-
ports with both the legislative history of section 1988 and the nature
and purpose of the contingent fee. The Ninth Circuit has held that
contingent fees should be upheld unless unreasonable. A contingent
fee should be a factor in the determination of the reasonable fee.
Furthermore, the court should have the discretion to compel the plain-
tiff to pay the difference between the fee awarded pursuant to sec-
tion 1988 and a contingent fee. Once Congress has adopted an objec-
tive, uniform set of criteria on which to base a reasonable fee, civil
litigants and attorneys will be able to commit themselves to civil rights
litigation.
Susan M. Murray
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